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ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES
As an appealing party, Peterson is entitled to choose the issues to be heard on crossappeal. Peterson selected the following issues for appeal: first, Peterson appealed the trial
court's legal conclusion regarding the valuation of and Peterson's entitlement to his share of
the $128,196.00 excess cash as of December 31, 2006; second, Peterson appealed the trial
court's prejudgment interest award to Peterson at a rate substantially less than the statutory
prejudgment interest rate of ten percent per annum; and, third, Peterson appealed the trial
court's legal conclusion that PAJ's oppressive conduct did not constitute legal oppression.
Peterson is not challenging any of the trial court's findings of fact. Therefore, Peterson has
no duty to marshal the evidence and this court should determine the aforestated issues as a
matters of law.
I.

PETERSON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HIS 36.37 PERCENT SHARE
OF THE $128,196.00 EXCESS CASH PAJ HAD ON HAND AS OF THE
DECEMBER 31, 2006, VALUATION DATE
Whether a given fact or circumstance is relevant to fair value under state law is a

question of law which an appellate court reviews de novo. Hogle v. Zinetice Med, Inc., 2002
UT 121, IflO 63 P.3d 80 {quotingSwope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.ed 486, 491 (8th Cir.
Mo. 2001)). Therefore, whether the fact that PAJ had $128,196.00 of undistributed cash as
of the valuation date is relevant to the fair value of Peterson's shares and whether such
requires Peterson to be awarded his 36.37 percent share of the "undistributed" or "excess"
cash is a question of law which this court should review de novo. Further, whether the

1

excess and distributable cash can be valued without necessity of speculation by the trial court
is an issue of law which should be reviewed de novo.
Contrary to PAJ's assertions (See Reply Brief of Appellants and Brief of CrossAppellants, at 11), Peterson is not challenging the court's findings of facts regarding the
amount of excess or distributable cash reserves, but rather that the cash could not be valued
and that the distributable cash reserves could not be considered in the overall valuation of the
Company without the trial court engaging in "speculation".
The trial court's April 17, 2009, Decision concluded as follows:
The Court heard evidence that at the end of every year most of the excess cash
was distributed to the partners which would leave very little cash reserves in
the following months. Plaintiff was fired in the fall and subsequently no cash
was distributed. The Court finds for reasons stated hereinafter that the
controlling partners in PAJ had the prerogative to manage the firm as they saw
fit, to include increasing cash reserves. Plaintiffs expert reduced cash in the
adjusted balance sheet approach so as to avoid double counting excess cash in
its valuation report. See Ex. 90, p. 27. Unfortunately, the Court could not find
nor determine what the Plaintiffs expert's subsequent value would be had the
excess cash been included and the Court was not willing to speculate.
(emphasis added).
The parties stipulated that there was $128,196.00 of undistributed cash as of
December 31,2006. (R. at 570, ^|10). PAJ primarily focuses on the argument that it needed
the excess cash in order to pay upcoming liabilities. While Peterson does not disagree with
PAJ's position that it may be appropriate for the business to hold some cash in reserve to
meet upcoming liabilities, he does object to funding such a reserve with his money which is
included in that reserve. The Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution Statute requires
Peterson's shares in PAJ to be valued as of a specific date (i.e., the December 31, 2006,
2

valuation date). See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(4). As of the valuation date PAJ had
cash reserves on hand in the amount of, and having the undisputed value of, $128,196.00.
On the valuation date the value of the Company included the total of its going concern value1
and excess cash after taking into account all Company liabilities as of that date.
Further, while the court concludes that PAJ management had a right to change
business practices, PAJ did not have the right to change business practices oppressively and
to the detriment of Peterson. The reason the Company had accumulated $128,196.00 of
distributable cash as of the valuation date (December 31,2006) is because the funds were not
needed for expenses prior to that date, nor were they being distributed to the owners, as they
should have been according to Company policy and historical practice. Such "change of
business practice" was done knowingly, intentionally, and oppressively to exclude Peterson
from his share of Company funds. PAJ recognized that they retained more cash when
dividing by two instead of three.
All parties in this action, including both parties' experts and the trial court,
acknowledged that there were distributable cash reserves after considering all outstanding
debts as of the valuation date in an amount of at least $128,196.00. (R. at 614, 618)
(stipulated fact that "Townsend further concluded Plaintiff was entitled to 36.37% of the

1 In its Reply Brief of Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellees at 16-17, PAJ now
concedes that it was proper for the trial court to value the Company as a going concern, as
was done by Plaintiffs expert, and ultimately adopted by the trial court, and not at
liquidation value, as was done by Defendants' expert, and ultimately rejected by the trial
court. See Decision, dated April 17, 2009 (Defendant erred by using an asset based/
liquidation approach).
3

$128,196.00 undistributed cash as of December 31, 2006, equaling $46,625.00"); see also
Reply Brief of Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellee, at p. 11 (PAJ acknowledging in "The
Amount of Excess Cash is a Question of Fact" section that there was $128,196.00 of cash on
hand as of the December 31, 2006, valuation date). Further, at trial both parties' experts
acknowledged and agreed that Peterson was in fact entitled to his 36.37 percent of the
distributable cash that existed as of the valuation date. See T. Vol. II at 229 (Bowles
testifying "[Peterson] gets his third of the cash or 36.37 percent of the cash that existed at 1231 [-06]"); Trial Exhibit 90 at 3-4 (Townsend determined Peterson entitled to 36.37 percent of
undistributed earnings as a separate component of fair value).
The trial court's April 17,2009, Decision regarding excess cash is "[u]nfortunately"]
that the Court could not find nor determine what Plaintiffs expert's valuation of PAJ would
have been had it been included in Plaintiff s expert's valuation and that speculation would be
necessary if the court was to determine the value of the excess cash and Peterson's
proportionate entitlement thereto. (R. at 620). However, what the court failed to recognize
was that Plaintiffs expert's valuation did, in fact, include afinalvaluation of PAJ containing
the excess cash. Plaintiffs expert's final valuation of Peterson's shares in PAJ as of the
valuation date was $505,625.00, which is comprised of "both components of value"
considered by Plaintiffs expert in determining a fair value (i.e., Peterson's interest in PAJ
excluding undistributed cash plus Peterson's interest in PAJ's undistributed cash). See Trial
Exhibit 90 at 4 (Rule 26(a)(3)(B) Report); see also Trial Exhibit 90, attachment 4, at 2,28).
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Further, even if the court could not find Plaintiffs expert's valuation of PAJ including
the excess cash, the trial court easily could have determined the value of the excess cash and
awarded Peterson his 36.37 percent, and could have done so without "speculation."
Speculation is not necessary to determine the value of cash. Obviously, the value of cash is
cash. There is no distinction or valuing difference if you are valuing a company as of a
specific date and cash is included in the value of the company or if the cash is included in the
valuation as a separate component of value.
Finally and contrary to PAJ's position, the court as a matter of law cannot and should
not take into account anticipated future debt to be incurred beyond the valuation date in
making its valuation of the Company. Moreover, such cannot be fairly done without taking
into account anticipated future revenues. Considering anticipated debts and revenues beyond
the valuation date violates the statutory mandates requiring valuation as of a certain date. See
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(4). Further, equity requires the court to value the Company
as of the valuation date without taking into account anticipated and unincurred future debts.
It is illogical and inequitable to require Peterson to subsidize the Company's anticipated
future liabilities by depriving him of his share of presently existing undistributed cash.
As a matter of law, Peterson should be awarded 36.37 percent of the undistributed
cash PAJ had on hand as of the valuation date.
II.

PETERSON'S AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE
ADJUSTED TO THE STATUTORY RATE OF TEN PERCENT PER ANNUM
A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest, "and the amount

thereof, presents a question of law which the appellate courts review for correctness.
5

Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, f4, 213 P.3d 13; see also Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ^fl, 82 P.3d 1064 (same standard). Prejudgment interest is
appropriately granted where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of
a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures. In such case interest
should be allowed from that time and not from the date ofjudgment. Canyon Country Store
v. Bracey, 741 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
In the trial court's Decision of April 17, 2009, it correctly determined Peterson
satisfied the prejudgment interest requirements, and as a matter of law determined to "award
[Peterson] prejudgment interest" accruing from the valuation date. (R. at 621-22, 625)
("Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest relating back to December 31, 2006").
However, the trial court erred in deviating without explanation or analysis from the standard
statutory rate often percent. Rather than taking guidance from the legislatively established
legal rate of prejudgment interest established in Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), the trial court
"[found] guidance in the Post Judgment Interest Rates set by the State of Utah." (R. at 621).
Peterson is not disputing any factual matters, but only the legal rate of prejudgment interest
that the court awarded. Therefore, no marshaling is required regarding prejudgment interest
and this court should determine the applicable rate of prejudgment interest as a matter of law.
The Utah Legislature has determined that the applicable legal prejudgment interest
rate when parties have not contractually agreed otherwise, is ten percent per annum. See
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1 -1 (2). This is the standard rate to be applied, and is deemed the "legal
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rate" of prejudgment interest. The Legislature has set the default prejudgment interest rate.
If a court wishes to deviate from the standard, the court must expressly justify its deviation.
Contrary to PAJ's assertions, Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 is applicable and relevant to
the awarded prejudgment interest on two fronts. First, Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 applies to
parties in a contractual relationship who have not established a rate of interest for, among
other things, a forbearance of a chose in action. Although PAJ is barred from raising this
objection because PAJ did not raise it below , PAJ asserts on appeal that this is not a contract
action and therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 does not apply. However, and contrary to
such assertion, the relationship between PAJ and Peterson is a contractual relationship. The
contract is evidenced by PAJ's written Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution as well as
the company Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. Further, the Articles of Incorporation
contractually grant Allred and Jackson the power they exercised to elect to purchase
Peterson's shares in lieu of dissolution. (R. at 66-67) (Election); see also Trial Exhibit 1,
Articles of Incorporation, at 1 ("The powers of this corporation and its officers are ... [tjhose
granted by the Utah Business Corporation Act"). Therefore, it is clear that there is a relevant
contractual basis for Peterson's claims and also that the contract documents do not provide
for a rate of interest to be applied when the corporation elects to purchase a shareholder's
shares in lieu of dissolution or for forbearance of claims or this chose in action.

2 See Hill v. Estate of Allred, 2009 UT 28, 216 P.3d 929 (holding Defendants who for the
first time on appeal objected to the award of prejudgment interest on the grounds that
there was no underlying contract, failed to preserve such objection (even though
Defendants had objected to the award of prejudgment interest on another basis at trial)
and the appellate court refused to address that argument's merits.)
7

Second, as briefed in Peterson's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Utah Code Ann. §
15-1-1 is relevant in that "interest" is defined in the Utah Corporations Code's Dissenter's
Rights section (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301(5)) by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1.
Principles of statutory construction suggest this definition of "interest" should serve as a
guide if not the standard under the Utah Corporations Code in determining and defining
"equitable interest" pursuant to the Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution section.
Using Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301(5)'s definition of interest as the standard or
guidance in interpreting the definition of interest as used in Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434 is
consistent with principles of statutory construction (as explained in Peterson's Brief of CrossAppellant) and does not render Utah Code Ann. § 1434(5)(c) meaningless or illusory, as
alleged by PAJ.
Further, the purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to compensate a party for the
depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, to deter parties from
intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. Encon Utah, LLC v. Flour
Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, f67, 210 P.3d 263. This purpose is different than the
purpose of postjudgment interest, which lacks the "deterrence" rationale. If the purposes of
prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest were the same, the Legislature would not
establish different rates, but would have a single "pre- and post- judgment interest rate."
However, the Utah Legislature has not done this, and, thus, the postjudgment interest rates
are not relevant to Peterson's prejudgment interest award. Since December 31, 2006, PAJ
has contracted to pay and has known it was obligated to pay Peterson the fair value of his
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shares. (See Election; See also Stipulated Pretrial Order.) For two and one-half years, PAJ
intentionally withheld making any payment to Peterson. For well over three years PAJ has
had use of Peterson's funds.
As mentioned in Peterson's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Utah Code Ann. §
16-1 Oa-1434(5)(c) provides "interest may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined
by the court to be equitable." There is no inconsistency with this provision and Peterson's
position that the standard for prejudgment interest in this case being ten percent per annum.
Section 1434(5)(c) merely affords the trial judge the discretion when warranted to deviate
from then ten percent standard. However, such equitable discretion cannot be used arbitrarily,
capriciously and without rational basis. As addressed above, the postjudment interest rates
are an irrelevant standard. Absent an expressed reason and justification for deviating from
the legislative standard of ten perecent prejudgment interest rate, the court is required to
follow the standard.
Therefore, this Court should award Peterson prejudgment interest at the rate often
percent per annum from December 31, 2006.
HI.

THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE DETERMINATION OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTION THAT
PAJ ENGAGED IN OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT
The Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution Statute authorizes the court to award

the petitioning shareholder attorney fees and costs if the court finds that the petitioning
shareholder had grounds for seeking judicial dissolution of a corporation due to behavior that
is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent by the Company's directors or those in control. Utah

9

Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(d); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2)(b).

Peterson is

appealing the question of law as to whether the trial court's findings regarding the behavior
of Allred and Jackson and PAJ constitutes sufficient legal oppression to qualify as grounds
for judicial dissolution under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2).
The trial court expressly considered the issue of "whether PAJ engaged in oppressive
conduct under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2), and, if so, whether under 16-10a1434(5)(d) to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs." (R. at 622-24). The trial
court made the following findings of fact and conclusions on this issue:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Peterson was denied access to corporate records and information (Id. at 623);
Computer passwords were changed to prevent Peterson's access to corporate
information (Id.);
Employees and clients were solicited and instructed to side with PAJ over Peterson
(Id);
Peterson was evicted from his office (Id.);
Trusted partners were turned against each other (Id.);
Employees were forced to pick between their jobs and loyalty to the remaining
partners (Id.);
Peterson was removed both physically and emotionally from the accounting firm that
he helped start over 22 years ago (Id.);
Peterson, a founding partner, was fired (Id.); and
PAJ's actions were insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, and overly aggressive (Id. at
623-24).
Despite making the aforementioned findings of fact and conclusions, the trial court

determined that PAJ did not engage in "oppressive" behavior and, therefore, attorneys fees
were not awarded. Id. at 12. Peterson is not challenging any of the findings of fact made
regarding oppression, but rather the legal conclusion that such facts do not constitute legal
oppression warranting dissolution. Therefore, contrary to PAJ's position, no marshaling is

10

necessary and this court should determine whether PAJ's actions constituted legal oppression
as a matter of law.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court faced a crossroads in determining the level of
fiduciary duties owed among shareholders in a closely held corporation ("CHC"), such as
PAJ. See, generally, McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146. The McLaughlin
plaintiff urged the Utah Supreme Court to follow the partnership-like duty standard,
originated in Massachusetts courts, whereby the court would impose on CHC shareholders
the same duties owed by partners—utmost good faith and loyalty to all shareholders of the
CHC. Id. at TJ18. This standard is "more rigorous" than the "somewhat less stringent"
corporate duty of "good faith and inherent fairness" owed in public corporations. Id. The
Massachusetts court explained, "stockholders in close corporations must discharge their
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good faith
standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their
duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation." Id. (quoting Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)).
The McLaughlin defendants, however, urged the Utah Supreme Court to take the
minority position which "narrowly construes the duties of shareholders in a closely held
corporation and differentiates between a person's status as employee and shareholder." Id. at
f 19. Under this approach the shareholders would not owe one another fiduciary duties. Id.
Presented with the two divergent approaches, the Utah Supreme Court decided the
Utah's corporate law scheme is intended to protect minority shareholders in CHCs from
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"misconduct" and "oppression" by those in control, and, therefore, adopted the partnershiplike standard which imposes fiduciary duties among shareholders of CHCs. Accordingly,
there is a duty imposed upon all shareholders in CHCs to observe the utmost good faith and
loyalty towards co-shareholders in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of
the corporation's business. Id. at ^ 1 6 , 2 3 . The court found the imposition of enhanced and
heightened fiduciary duties are used to "stem... shareholder oppression" (including "freeze
outs, squeeze outs, and other forms of oppression"), thereby, making a violation of such
fiduciary duties oppressive behavior. Id. at f 22.
With this imposition of enhanced and heightened fiduciary duties among shareholders
of a CHC requiring all shareholders in CHCs to observe the utmost good faith and loyalty
toward co-shareholders, it is clear Jackson and Allred engaged in behavior that violated the
fiduciary duties they owed to Peterson. The findings of fact enunciated above and the trial
court's conclusion that PAJ's actions were insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, and overly
aggressive, by definition and as a matter of law constitute a breach of fiduciary duties and
legal oppression.
The Pretrial Order provided that the trial court would separately consider attorney fees
if it found oppression or misapplication of assets. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should
determine the findings of fact regarding PAJ's oppressive behavior constitute legal

3 In PAJ's Reply Brief of Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellees, at 30, PAJ
acknowledges fiduciary duties were owed among the Company's shareholders. PAJ
claims Peterson had an equal fiduciary duty to the other shareholders. Peterson agrees,
but points out the findings do not show that Peterson violated his fiduciary duties or
otherwise engaged in oppressive behavior.
12

oppression, and remand the case with such determination to the trial court judge for
determination of attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(d).

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Peterson should be awarded an additional $46,625.00,
constituting his share of the PAJ undistributed cash on hand as of the valuation date.
Peterson should be awarded prejudgment interest on the adjusted total judgment amount at
the statutory prejudgment interest rate often percent per annum. Finally, this matter should
be remanded for the purpose of awarding Peterson his attorneys' fees and costs, at trial and
on appeal, due to PAJ's and the Remaining Shareholders' oppressive behavior, their appeal
and PAJ' s failure to marshal evidence as to their appeal (See generally Motional for Attorney's
Fees and Costs Incurred on Appeal, dated March 26, 2010).

Respectfully submitted this j i o
June, 2010

day of

OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee and
Cross-Appellant
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